Heisenberg’s final theory
Last month, I was at Foundations 2018 in Utrecht. It is one of the biggest conferences on the foundations of physics, bringing together physicists, philosophers, and historians of science. A talk I found particularly interesting was that of Alexander Blum, from the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, entitled Heisenberg’s 1958 Weltformel & the roots of post-empirical physics. Let me briefly summarize Blum’s fascinating story.
In 1958, Werner Heisenberg put forward a new theory of matter that, according to his peers (and to every physicist today) could not possibly be correct, failing to reproduce most known microscopic phenomena. Yet he firmly believed in it, worked on it restlessly (at least for a while), and presented it to the public as a major breakthrough. How was such an embarrassment possible given that Heisenberg was one of the brightest physicists of the time? One could try to find the answer in Heisenberg’s personal shortcomings, in his psychology, in his age, perhaps even in his deluded attempt at making a comeback after the sad episode of his work on the nazi Uranprojekt during World War II. Blum’s point is that the answer lies, rather, in the very peculiar nature of modern physical theories, where mathematical constraints strongly guide theory building.


